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Justice without Moral Responsibility? 
Introduction 
In recent years, a growing number of theorists have argued that there is an important sense in 
which no-one is morally responsible for their actions (e.g., Pereboom 2006, Caruso 2019, 
Vilhauer 2013, Waller 2017, Corrado 2001, Levy 2011, Smilansky 2000, Greene and Cohen 
2004). Broadly speaking, moral responsibility depends on two pre-requisites: firstly, an 
epistemic requirement (such as the ability to understand the nature of one’s action and whether 
it was morally right or wrong) and, secondly, a control or “free will” requirement. The 
challenge to moral responsibility typically focuses on the second requirement and so theorists 
who make this challenge can be referred to as “moral responsibility sceptics” or “free will 
sceptics”. There is a vast literature on the various reasons for being sceptical about free will 
and moral responsibility (for an overview see Caruso 2018). For example, some sceptics argue 
that if all our actions are ultimately determined by causal factors outside our control, such as 
our genes and upbringing, then we cannot be responsible for our actions, as these actions would 
be the inevitable consequence of causal factors for which we were not responsible. Many 
sceptics also claim that if, on the other hand, determinism is false, we would still not be free or 
morally responsible, as our actions would be a matter of luck – agents would be “unable to 
settle whether a decision/action occurs and hence [would not] have the control in action 
required for moral responsibility” (Caruso 2018). It has become increasingly common for 
sceptics to support traditional philosophical arguments against free will and moral 
responsibility with empirical evidence, such as findings from neuroscience.  
 
This article will not focus on the reasons for rejecting (certain mainstream conceptions of) 
“free will” and “moral responsibility”, but will instead concentrate on the implications of doing 
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so. Some writers fear that rejecting these ideas would have devastating social consequences 
(e.g. Smilansky 2000, 2001, 2011) . For example, it has been suggested that if the public came 
to disbelieve in free will and moral responsibility, people would be much more likely to behave 
immorally. As Nadelhoffer and Wright (2017) have put it, “…in this respect, the  possible 
spectre of widespread scepticism about free will is as much a public policy issue as it is a 
metaphysical debate”. If these fears were well-founded, this would raise the ethical question 
whether researchers or even governments have a duty to withhold/supress information that 
supports free will scepticism in order to protect the public from this “dangerous knowledge”.1 
In contrast, certain free will sceptics - whom Gregg Caruso (e.g. Caruso 2018) calls “optimistic 
sceptics” - argue that if this information is communicated properly, it could have neutral or 
positive effects on people’s behaviour (and there is some empirical evidence to support this 
optimism - Levy et al 2018). Optimistic sceptics may also advocate finding effective ways of 
communicating arguments about free will scepticism to policy-makers, as, they argue, policies 
based on free will scepticism could be beneficial for society.  
 
This article will focus on one important social implication of scepticism about free will and 
moral responsibility: the implication that we should abandon retributivism, which posits that 
offenders deserve to be punished (in proportion to their wrongdoing) because they were 
morally responsible for committing crimes, and that those who were not morally responsible 
for committing crimes do not deserve punishment. Many moral responsibility sceptics argue 
that, instead of focusing, as retributivists do on making offenders suffer for their past moral 
wrongdoing, society’s approach to criminal behaviour should seek to achieve forward-looking 
aims, such as preventing future crimes. Is the idea of abandoning retributivism something that 
we should worry about? In addition to the free will sceptics’ claim that retribution is based on 
an unsound conception of moral responsibility, our current system of dealing with offenders – 
informed as it is by retributive thinking – faces a range of other serious criticisms, including 
evidence of its limited effectiveness in promoting important social goals such as rehabilitating 
and reforming offenders.  However, this same criminal justice system, despite its flaws, also 
                                                 
1 Similar issues have arisen in other contexts (e.g. Kozlowski and Sweanor 2016). 
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contains vitally important safeguards for human rights, including the rights of offenders. 
Hence, there is a strong temptation to resist calls from free will sceptics (and others) to alter 
the current system radically, for fear of “throwing out the baby with the bathwater”. 
 
Retributivists do not just aim to provide a positive reason in favour of punishment, and are not 
only concerned with safeguarding the rights of victims, or society. Retributivism, arguably, 
also provides a rationale for having important safeguards for the rights of offenders and those 
accused of crimes. Retributivists have claimed, that if society abandoned retribution, the rights 
of offenders and accused people would not be respected and, in this sense, they would be treated 
unjustly. Although there are also many other grounds on which retributivists might object to 
moral responsibility scepticism, the objection that sceptics’ proposals would undermine the 
rights of offenders and accused people deserves particular attention. If successful, this 
objection would undercut one of the main practical advantages that optimistic sceptics claim 
would result from applying their theory to social practices and institutions. These sceptics claim 
that their approach to criminal justice would be more humane than the supposed vengefulness 
of traditional retributivism. However, if the above-mentioned retributive objection is sound, 
then far from being humane, moral responsibility scepticism could lead to grave injustices and 
ill-treatment including: 1) framing the innocent, 2) grossly disproportionately severe 
punishments and 3) the absence of due process safeguards such as a) placing the burden of 
proof on the state to provide strong evidence before coercive measures can be imposed on an 
offender and b)  the right of accused people to challenge the case against them. 
 
This article will argue that moral responsibility sceptics can justify safeguards against the three 
practices mentioned above and can explain why these practices are unjust by referring to non-
retributive considerations. However, it will add the following caveats. Firstly, the nature of the 
safeguards recommended by this non-retributive account are not identical to the safeguards 
proposed by retributivists (particularly in regard to disproportionality). Secondly, the 
explanation provided in this article of why it would be “unjust” to fail to have these safeguards 
will not entirely satisfy a purely retributive conception of justice. Instead, the article aims to 
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identify types of non-retributive injustice that occur in cases of framing, disproportionately 
severe punishments, or due process violations and argues that these non-retributive 
considerations provide sufficient reasons to have safeguards against such practices (even if 
retributivists would not think these considerations constitute a complete account of what is 
unjust about these practices). If this argument is successful, it would weaken the case that moral 
responsibility scepticism would have dire implications for the criminal justice system. 
 
The account provided here has some similarities to Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s 
defence of their quarantine-public health model of criminal behaviour, which draws an analogy 
between offenders and carriers of dangerous diseases (e.g. Pereboom and Caruso 2002). This 
is one of the most impressive and well-developed models of non-retributive criminal justice 
and the account defended here is in agreement with their general approach. However, unlike 
the Pereboom-Caruso model, the argument put forward in this article focuses on an analogy 
with the treatment of offenders who are non-responsible due to mental disorders, which leads 
to somewhat different conclusions from those drawn by Pereboom and Caruso. Before 
developing this argument, the article begins by explaining the sense of “moral responsibility” 
that is challenged by sceptics and by further analysing the above-mentioned retributive 
objection to moral responsibility scepticism.   
 
Moral Responsibility and Retribution  
 
Pereboom (2018, p3) provides the following definition of the type of moral responsibility 
challenged by sceptics, which he calls the “basic desert” sense of moral responsibility: 
 
 “For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in the basic desert sense is for the action 
to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was 
morally wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally 
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent, to be morally 
responsible, would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, 
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given sensitivity to its moral status; and not, for example, by virtue of consequentialist or 
contractualist considerations” 
 
Moral responsibility sceptics can accept that there are other senses of “moral responsibility” 
that are not challenged by their arguments. For example Pereboom (2018, p3) endorses the 
following “moral protest” account of moral responsibility and blame:  
 
 “For B to blame A is for B to issue a moral protest against A for immoral conduct that B 
attributes (however accurately) to A. Such moral protest might indeed have the aims of 
character formation, reconciliation in relationships, retention of integrity, and protection.”  
 
Retributivism (as traditionally formulated) seems to depend on the “basic desert” sense of 
moral responsibility. For instance, according to the influential version of retributivism 
defended by Michael Moore (2010), wrongdoers should be punished simply because they 
deserve it, since “the suffering of the guilty is intrinsically good”. On this view, punishment 
may happen to promote good consequences, such as protecting society from future crimes, but 
such consequences form no part of the justification for or the intended aim of punishment.2 In 
contrast, sceptics, like Pereboom, justify punishment by appealing to the need to protect 
society. For Pereboom, it seems that moral responsibility in the sense of “moral protest” against 
wrongdoing can inform how offenders are treated (e.g. can form part of a rehabilitation 
programme), but does not provide the main justification for punishment. Pereboom’s (2006) 
justification is based on the idea that, just as society has a right to quarantine carriers of certain 
                                                 
2 In Moore’s version of retributivism, the connection between “basic desert” and the justification of punishment 
is clear, as for Moore, deserving punishment (like deserving blame) just depends on the offender’s wrongdoing, 
rather than on further consequences that might flow from punishing/blaming.  In contrast, the relationship is more 
complex for those retributive theories that allow that punishment can have forward-looking aims. For “mixed” 
theories, establishing that someone was morally responsible in the basic desert sense might be seen as providing 
“permission” for the state to impose hardships on the offender (partly) in order to achieve forward looking aims 
(Lewis 1953, Strawson 1962). It might be said that basic desert is one element of these mixed theories. However, 
other retributivists (e.g. Duff 2001) might not seem to rely on basic desert, viewed as an element separate from 
punishment’s forward looking aims, since, on Duff’s view, forward- looking aims (e.g. reform) are meant to be 
internally connected to the backward looking aspect of punishment (holding offenders responsible for their 
crimes). 
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dangerous easily communicable diseases, it has a right to preventatively detain those offenders 
who pose a serious risk of harm to others.  
 
Approaches that compare wrongdoing to illness and advocate social protection have long been 
opposed by advocates of basic desert moral responsibility. PF Strawson (1962), who had a 
profound influence on the free will literature, suggested that it would be psychologically 
impossible to give up the idea of moral responsibility (in something like the basic desert sense), 
but that even if this were possible it would be undesirable, as it would mean treating all 
wrongdoers in the same way that we treat the mentally ill. He claimed this would involve 
viewing them as things to be manipulated, rather than as persons who have rights. He wrote:  
 
“In the extreme case of the mentally deranged, it is easy to see …the impossibility of what we 
understand by ordinary inter-personal relationships. Given this …impossibility, no other 
civilized attitude is available than that of viewing the deranged person simply as something to 
be understood and controlled in the most desirable fashion.” 
 
 Similarly, the retributivist, CS Lewis, warned that if retribution were abandoned in favour of 
harm prevention, responsible offenders would be objectified and would no longer be protected 
by considerations of justice: 
“There is no sense in talking about a...‘just cure’... We demand of a cure not whether it 
is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what the criminal 
deserves and consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed 
him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we 
now have a mere object, a patient, a ‘case’.”3  
 
                                                 
3. PF Strawson (1962) also advocated drawing a sharp distinction between the norms governing sane and insane 
law-breakers on similar grounds. 
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In recent years, Lewis’s article has still been cited approvingly (e.g. Morse, Vincent) and 
other writers (even if they do not endorse his retributivism) have raised related concerns (e.g. 
Smilansky 2011, Dennett 2011, 2018). 
 
Retributivists maintain that they can provide an intuitively plausible account of justice. Their 
focus on basic desert provides a simple explanation of why it would be unjust to punish the 
innocent or to inflict disproportionately severe punishments – these individuals do not deserve 
such treatment, since they were not, or were not sufficiently, morally blameworthy. It has, 
however, been argued that retributivists’ idea of “proportionality” is too vague or disputed to 
provide an adequate safeguard against ill-treatment of offenders (Caruso 2018). Retributivists 
also typically claim that their theory explains the importance of due process rights, e.g. that the 
state must prove the offender’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This claim has also been 
challenged, since retributivism per se does not state whether punishing the innocent is worse 
than not punishing the guilty (Tadros 2012), but such critiques of retributivism will not be 
explored here. Instead, this article will contest the claim that social-protection approaches to 
criminal justice, or the sort defended by moral responsibility sceptics like Pereboom, remove 
offenders from the “sphere of justice” and “rights” altogether. It will argue that offenders would 
still be protected by non-retributive considerations of justice, in virtue of the fact that they are 
persons. It will focus on an analogy with those who are non-responsible due to mental illness, 
as this example has been invoked by critics of moral responsibility scepticism, but, in fact, 
supports the claim that moral and legal rights should (and to some extent already are) accorded 
to non-responsible individuals, based on their personhood. 
 
Framing the Innocent 
Here is an example that is frequently cited by retributivists to support the idea that retributivism 
is preferable to forward-looking approaches to punishment, such as consequentialist 
approaches:   
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Framing a moral agent 
A horrible act of violence is committed and the culprit cannot be found. A riot 
will ensue that will harm many innocent people, unless the mob is persuaded 
that the wrongdoer has been apprehended and punished. So the authorities frame 
and punish an innocent man. (McCloskey 1972)  
 Retributivists allege that consistent consequentialists must endorse this, since the authorities’ 
actions promoted the best over-all consequences.  Only retributivism, they claim, can 
adequately explain why the framed person has been treated unjustly. To understand the basis 
for a non-retributive prohibition on framing the innocent, consider the following example:  
Framing someone who is not a morally responsible agent 
A horrible act of violence is committed by an attacker with severe learning 
disabilities. The attacker cannot be found. A riot will ensue that will harm many 
innocent people, unless the mob is persuaded that that the attacker has been 
apprehended and confined in a secure mental hospital. The authorities find a 
man, Timothy, who has severe learning disabilities, but who has never 
committed an act of violence before. Timothy is perfectly harmless and has until 
now enjoyed his freedom to move about the town and interact with the 
townspeople and wants to be liked by them. However, due to his mental 
condition, he cannot be considered a morally responsible agent. Because of 
various circumstances, the authorities are able to persuade the mob that Timothy 
was the attacker. So the authorities frame Timothy and shut him up in a secure 
mental hospital (despite knowing that he is perfectly safe and was not the 
attacker).  
It seems intuitive to say that Timothy has been treated unjustly. Retributivists cannot explain 
this intuition with reference to retributive desert. Retributive desert does not come into it. The 
authorities do not claim that Timothy deserves to be locked up. Timothy is not a responsible 
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agent and so would not deserve retributive blame even if he had been the attacker. The actual 
attacker (due to the severity of his mental condition) does not deserve retribution either.  
The authorities’ actions can be criticised for the following reasons. Firstly, they have wronged 
Timothy by lying about him. The lie is particularly objectionable because it denies important 
good qualities that Timothy actually has (e.g. gentleness and friendliness), and falsely asserts 
that he has serious negative qualities (a propensity to kill innocent people). True, Timothy is 
not responsible for having these good qualities, nor do the authorities claim that Timothy is 
responsible for his alleged negative qualities.  Nevertheless, it seriously wrongs a person to tell 
this kind of lie about him.  Furthermore, Timothy is detained on the basis of such outrageous 
lies. This also wrongs him, because the grounds of his detention are illegitimate. Timothy’s 
detention also treats him merely as a means to avert a threat from elsewhere. It does not seek 
to eliminate a threat that he himself poses.4 Victor Tadros has persuasively argued that the 
objection against using someone merely as a means is best characterised as an objection against 
“manipulative use” – where someone is used in order to promote some further, independent 
goal. In contrast, harming someone to eliminate a threat they pose is much easier to justify, 
based on the right to self-defence. Tadros cites a wide range of examples where it is intuitively 
objectionable to use someone manipulatively (although he maintains that in exceptional cases 
the prohibition on manipulative use can be outweighed). Tadros’s interpretation of the mere 
means principle as prohibiting “manipulative use” also seems to provide a plausible 
explanation of the intuition that framing Timothy is unjust. It will be assumed, for the purposes 
of this article, that Tadros’s distinction between eliminating harm and manipulative use is valid 
(although the way he uses these ideas in his justification of punishment will not be endorsed).  
A moral responsibility sceptic, who argues that nobody is morally responsible in the basic 
desert sense, could still raise the above-mentioned objections against framing an innocent 
person (regardless of whether the person had a mental disorder), since it is plausible that all 
                                                 
4 The mere means argument was famously put forward by Kant. However, Kant seems to have tied this argument 
to the idea of rational agency, so it is not clear whether non-rational agents are protected by the duty of respect 
for persons as he originally formulated it (Kant 1948, p85). However, it is submitted that the principle of respect 
for persons should extend to non-rational or partially rational people such as the mentally ill, learning disabled 
people and young children (See A Wood and O O’Neill 1998).  
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persons, regardless of their moral responsibility status, have the rights not to be lied about and 
not to be treated merely as a means (in the sense of manipulative use).   
 
Pereboom and Caruso have also argued that free will sceptics can appeal to the prohibition 
against treating an offender merely as a means in order to explain why only genuinely 
dangerous offenders may be incapacitated.5 Appealing to their quarantine analogy, they argue 
that the “mere means” prohibition can be outweighed or does not apply in cases where a disease 
carrier’s freedom is restricted to prevent the spread of a dangerous disease, and so, similarly, 
this prohibition is outweighed or does not apply where offenders’ freedom is restricted to 
prevent them harming others. But if the someone does not pose a direct threat (as Timothy does 
not in the example above), it would be illegitimate to restrict his/her freedom as a means of 
promoting the general good. It might be wondered whether the quarantine analogy provides a 
sufficiently strong basis for protecting non-offenders against state interference. After all, the 
state can isolate carriers of diseases who have not yet done harm (i.e. they have not actually 
infected anyone else yet) and can even quarantine those who have been exposed to the disease, 
but might not even be carriers. In response to this potential limitation of the quarantine 
comparison, Pereboom does invoke a comparison with individuals suffering from mental 
illness, arguing that it should be required that they have done harm or have expressed a clear 
intention to do harm before they can be legitimately detained, and that the same sort of 
requirement should be met before sane offenders can be detained. 
 However, Pereboom does not use the analogy with mentally ill individuals to rule out framing 
specifically and it is not clear that the way he uses the mental illness example, in the context of 
the rest of his account, could rule out all objectionable kinds of framing. Pereboom (2018)  
                                                 
5 Pereboom previously argued that incapacitating dangerous offenders involved using them, but that the use 
objection was outweighed by the right to self-defence. Subsequently, he endorsed Tadros’s analysis, according 
to which self-defensive harm does not count as “manipulative use” (compare Pereboom 2014 and 2018). 
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argues that it is “the right to life, liberty, and physical security of the person that have a key 
role in making the manipulative use objection …intuitive. Those rights are grounded in the 
more fundamental right to a life in which one’s capacity for flourishing is not compromised in 
the long term.” He claims that the presumption against manipulative use is particularly strong, 
where that use involves “intentional killing, long-term confinement and infliction of severe 
physical or psychological harm”. Yet, framing an innocent person would still be unjust even if 
the punishment were not severe, or even if there were no punishment.  
The retributivist would say that the injustice of framing could be explained in terms of the 
retributive principle that only wrongdoers should be convicted or subjected to (even mild) 
punishments. Yet, the example provided in this article suggests that there is another, non-
retributive account of the injustice of framing, based on the prohibition against manipulative 
use, provided that this prohibition is conceived of more broadly than Pereboom suggests.6 The 
false declaration, which the authorities make in order to quell the angry mob, that Timothy 
(albeit in a non-responsible state) committed the violent attack, is manipulative and unjust. 
Furthermore, detaining him in hospital, to satisfy the mob, might not greatly compromise his 
capacity for “flourishing” in the “long-term”, as the conditions in hospital might not be much 
worse than the conditions he would face in ordinary life and it might not be for that long. But 
such detention would still be manipulative and unjust. Given that Timothy is non-responsible 
(and no-one is claiming that he is responsible), this suggests that even if we adopted scepticism 
about moral responsibility in general and abandoned retributivism, we could still justify a 
prohibition on framing non-offenders, based on the manipulative use objection (conceived 
broadly). Furthermore, the moral responsibility sceptic can appeal to a broader range of rights 
than Pereboom mentions, including reputational damage (which Pereboom does not discuss in 
                                                 
6 Pereboom’s narrow conception of the stringent prohibition on manipulative use, allows him to justify the 
imposition of sanctions as a limited form of general deterrence, but, as discussed under “Proportionality” 
(below) this manoeuvre seems questionable. 
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this context). Timothy’s reputation would be damaged by the lie that he committed a violent 
attack, even if no-one alleged that he was morally responsible for it. This would be unjust even 
if it did not cause him “psychological harm”.  His learning disabilities might prevent him from 
appreciating the wrong that had been done to him and from being psychologically harmed by 
that knowledge, but he would still have been treated unjustly. 
Now, the retributivist will object that the manipulative use prohibition and the reputational 
damage involved in falsely accusing someone of non-culpably doing harm do not capture 
everything that is unjust about framing a sane person for a crime they did not commit. For the 
retributivist, to capture this injustice, one must invoke the idea of moral responsibility. In 
response, it is conceded that the account defended here will not satisfy those who are already 
committed to a retributive conception of justice. This article just aims to identify one type of 
injustice that is involved in the framing of non-offenders that does not depend on the ideas of 
moral responsibility and retribution. If the argument succeeds, then it is not true that, as some 
retributivists have alleged, abandoning retributive moral responsibility would mean removing 
offenders from the sphere of justice altogether. It is submitted that the reason why this non-
retributive account can claim to involve a conception of justice is because of its focus on 
individual rights. Unlike consequentialist objections to framing people, the reasons given here 
seem to capture the intuitive idea that framing is unjust, because the framed person has been 
victimised. The consequentialist rationale refers to some calculation of the general welfare and 
this fails to capture our intuitions about the injustice done to the individual.7 
                                                 
7 Having said this, there may be some extreme situations in which framing non-offenders is permissible. If the 
authorities knew that the world would be destroyed unless an innocent person was framed, then framing that 
person seems permissible in this dire situation. Nevertheless, an injustice would still have been done to the 
individual, even though it would be permissible on balance to perpetrate this injustice. This is an outcome that 
most retributivists would accept. At precisely what point consequences can be said to be sufficiently serious to 
warrant inflicting injustice is a hard question. But it is no harder for the theory being defended here than for 
retributive theories. Recognising the tension between the need to do justice, and the need to avert bad 
consequences better captures the complexity of our moral experience, than a theory that claims to produce neat, 
conflict-free answers to such questions 
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Benjamin Vilhauer (2013) has proposed a different kind of personhood-based, non-retributive 
argument against framing the innocent. According to Vilhauer, respecting someone’s 
personhood means treating them in a way that they would rationally consent to be treated. He 
does not rely on the person’s actual consent, but on the notion of ‘hypothetical consent’– i.e. 
they would consent to be treated this way if they were rational. He uses Rawls’s idea of ‘the 
original position’ to model rational consent (Rawls 1999). The original position is a thought 
experiment in which people choose the rules that will govern a society. The rules are chosen 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’: the choosers are unaware of certain facts about what their own 
position will be in the society and what personal characteristics (e.g. race, gender, wealth, 
strength, intelligence and industriousness) they will have. They are aware of the fundamental 
interests that they all have in common (e.g. security and the freedom to pursue one’s goals) and 
they have knowledge of relevant scientific and sociological theories. The veil of ignorance is 
designed to describe a situation of fairness among the social contractors, to ensure their 
impartiality and to filter out factors that are just down to luck. Each deliberator must also 
imagine that he or she is just as likely to be harmed by any principle that is chosen as to benefit 
from it. Vilhauer, unlike Rawls, includes knowledge of whether one will be a wrongdoer as a 
factor that is hidden from the social contractors. This is because Vilhauer is a free will sceptic 
and believes that one’s moral character is, like race and gender, a product of the genetic and 
environmental lottery. Vilhauer claims that respecting someone’s personhood means treating 
them as they would rationally consent to be treated, i.e. in accordance with a principle that 
would have been agreed to by deliberators in the original position. He claims that no rational 
deliberator could have chosen the principle that the authorities may, when it is expedient, frame 
innocent individuals. Such a regime would involve the authorities systematically deceiving the 
members of this society. Otherwise, the scapegoating of innocent individuals would be 
ineffective. A deliberator in the original position must acknowledge that under this regime he 
could be one of those who are deceived about a basic principle governing that society. 
Consenting to systematic deception undermines one’s status as a rational agent. Therefore, 
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according to Vilhauer, the idea that a rational deliberator would choose to be systematically 
deceived about something so important is self-contradictory.8  
Vilhauer’s argument is intriguing and could be invoked to supplement the position defended in 
this article. However, it does not seem to capture the main reason why the authorities’ actions 
are wrongful in the two framing cases. Intuitively, the main injustice in both cases is the wrong 
that has been done to the framed individual. However, Vilhauer’s explanation focuses on the 
wrong of deceiving the general public. On Vilhauer’s account, the wrong that is done to the 
framed individual derives from the supposed logical problems with a principle that endorses 
deceiving the public. This seems too indirect.  
Furthermore, it is not obvious that choosing to be deceived by the authorities is necessarily 
irrational.  Imagine that the original position deliberator is considering whether to choose the 
principle that the authorities must never deceive the public even if that is the only way to 
prevent a riot. The deliberator must assume that she is equally likely to be harmed by that policy 
as to benefit from it. In other words, the deliberator must assume that, if the policy were 
implemented, she might well end up as one of the people harmed or killed in the riot. It is not 
obviously irrational for the deliberator to prefer the risk of being deceived by the authorities to 
the risk of being harmed or killed in the riot. It does not seem that Vilhauer’s argument can 
support the strong claim that consenting to such deception is logically contradictory. However, 
it might support a weaker claim. There is a disturbing paradox in the idea of a rational agent 
choosing to be systematically deceived and the original position deliberator certainly has 
reason to hesitate before endorsing such deception. This would not necessarily lead to a 
complete prohibition on framing innocent individuals in all cases, but it does imply that these 
cases are always ethically troubling. Perhaps this better captures the conflicting intuitions that 
are evoked by cases of framing than a principle which categorically prohibits framing ‘though 
the heavens may fall’. If this modification of Vilhauer’s argument is successful, then this 
argument can provide an additional non-retributive explanation of our concerns about framing. 
                                                 
8 This strategy of arguing is also inspired by Kant. 
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Proportionality 
If desert were abandoned, some fear that the state’s response to law–breaking would no longer 
be governed by principles of proportionality. For instance, Lewis maintained that a medical 
model of punishment would permit the authorities to interfere with the liberty of citizens, 
whenever the authorities found this convenient. They would simply label the citizens 
‘diseased’. He claimed that the authorities could impose on such unfortunate citizens any 
‘treatment’, no matter how burdensome, and any period of confinement, no matter how lengthy. 
Ordinary people, he maintained, would have no basis for objecting to this on grounds of justice, 
since ‘justice’ is a retributive concept (Lewis 1953). 
This line of argument is based on a misconception of the principles that should apply to the 
mentally ill. It is unjust to confine someone or force her to undergo treatment against her will 
merely because she has a mental illness. She must pose a threat to the safety of herself or 
others.9 Furthermore, certain treatments are so risky or so devastating to the individual that it 
would be unjust to impose them on her, even if she is mentally ill and dangerous. It would also 
be unfair to impose a particularly lengthy or onerous treatment/confinement on someone if her 
behaviour only had a relatively minor impact on the welfare of any particular individual.10 For 
instance it would be grossly unfair to lock up a mentally ill person for life in a secure institution, 
just because she made loud noises in the street, causing only minor irritation. This is a 
consideration of proportionality (though clearly of a non-retributive kind). It is not merely a 
question of whether the intervention is necessary in order to prevent the objectionable 
behaviour. It is conceivable that for some people, a measure almost as drastic as confinement 
in an institution might be required in order to prevent them from causing a nuisance. Imposing 
such a drastic measure would still be unjust. This proportionality constraint is not merely the 
result of utilitarian calculation. Classical utilitarianism is aggregative. On an aggregative 
approach if enough people were each caused a tiny bit of distress by the nuisance, then that 
could eventually outweigh the interests of mentally ill person and justify locking her up. In 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, ASP 13. 
10 In the context of a discussion of the punishment of sane offenders, this principle is defended in Honderich 1984, 
p78.  
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contrast the proportionality principle defended here states that the intervention must be 
proportionate to the impact that the harm to be prevented by the intervention would have on 
any particular victim. So a greater intervention, such as lengthy confinement, would be 
justified to prevent killing or a serious violent or sexual attack. Whereas a much more minor 
intervention, such as counselling, or supervision in the community would be justified to prevent 
nuisances.  The proportionality principle is based on respect for the separateness of persons 
and on an ideal of equality – it is prima facie wrong to create a situation where people suffer 
grossly unequal levels of distress.11  
If this principle of proportionality applies to insane law-breakers who are clearly not deserving 
of retribution, then an analogous principle of proportionality would also be available to sane 
offenders under a non-retributive system. It might be objected that the proportionality principle 
does not give very precise recommendations about the exact degree of burdensomeness that is 
appropriate in each case. However, this “vagueness” objection is arguably even more of a 
problem for retributive conceptions of proportionality (Caruso 2018).  
Pereboom and Caruso have also defended something similar to the non-retributive 
proportionality principle outlined above, based on the quarantine analogy. They argue that the 
coercive measures imposed on offenders should be proportionate to the harm offenders pose 
and should constitute the least infringement of their rights necessary to protect society from 
their harmful conduct. However, Pereboom (2018), has recently departed somewhat from this 
model in response to criticisms from general deterrence theorists. Although some level of 
deterrence may result as a side-effect of a system based on incapacitation (which Pereboom 
“free deterrence”), Pereboom concedes that a greater level of deterrence might be desirable. 
He therefore argues that it can be justifiable to impose measures on an offender that are 
“somewhat” harsher than would be necessary to protect society from the harm the offender 
poses, provided that this would provide substantial benefits in terms of general deterrence or 
                                                 
11 Like most of the principles of justice defended here, this is a strong presumption, but not necessarily an absolute 
prohibition in all cases. As noted earlier, retributivists themselves often admit that principles of justice can 
sometimes be outweighed if the consequences are serious enough. 
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cost-effectiveness. This would might seem to breach the prohibition on manipulative use, since 
part of the sanction is imposed in order to promote a further goal, independent of the need to 
eliminate the threat posed by the offender. Pereboom justifies this by invoking the idea 
(mentioned in the section on framing, above) that the prohibition on manipulative use applies 
most stringently to using people in a way that that would seriously compromise their capacity 
for to lead a life at a reasonable level of flourishing. He argues that short prison terms and large 
fines can be justified on the grounds of general deterrence or cost-effectiveness, as these 
sanctions would not seriously compromise their capacity for flourishing.  
Does the analogy with mentally disordered offenders imply, contrary to Pereboom’s analysis, 
imply that imposing sanctions to achieve general deterrence would violate non-retributive 
principles of proportionality (and the prohibition on manipulative use)? Well, it does not seem 
to rule out what Pereboom calls “free deterrence”. A measure may be used as a deterrent, 
provided that it is also strictly necessary in order to incapacitate the dangerous person. It is 
possible that someone may be non-responsible, due to her mental condition, but also capable 
to a certain extent of being deterred. For instance, a person with severe learning disabilities 
may understand that some form of behaviour (e.g. running into the road, or being violent) will 
result in a negative consequence for her (e.g. she will have less freedom, and be subject to 
greater supervision). The thought of this negative consequence may help to restrain her from 
engaging in the dangerous behaviour. It is not wrong for her carers to explain to the person (in 
humane, non-inflammatory terms) that these negative consequences will occur as a result of 
such behaviour and have been imposed on others. They may explain this in the hope that this 
will affect the conduct of the person with learning disabilities. The knowledge that mentally ill 
offenders will still be confined, if dangerous, may also deter some sane offenders from trying 
to fake an insanity defence. The state does not wrong mentally ill law-breakers by publically 
pointing out that such law-breakers need to be confined if dangerous. Any deterrent effect such 
statements may have is no bad thing, provided that the authorities do not use unduly 
stigmatising and inflammatory language. Therefore, moral responsibility sceptics could also 
legitimately rely on this type of deterrence, when dealing with sane offenders. 
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However, the analogy with mentally disordered offenders suggests it would not be legitimate 
to impose additional periods of detention (over-and-above what would be needed for 
incapacitation) for the sake of general deterrence. It would be unjust to confine a non-dangerous 
mentally ill person in order to ‘make an example’ of him, even if this were just for a short 
period. However, it might be easier for the moral responsibility sceptic to justify imposing fines 
aimed at compensating victims (in addition to preventative detention, or where detention was 
unnecessary). In tort law, individuals with mental disorders (no matter how severe) who 
negligently harm others are still liable to compensate their victims.   
How would consequentialist and retributive theories deal with the issue of deterrence? Many 
consequentialist theories would allow sane people (and possibly also mentally disordered 
people) to be harmed in order to deter others. However, these theories are vulnerable to the 
retributive challenge that they allow offenders and accused people to be treated in ways that 
strike many as intuitively unjust. Pure retributivists would argue that any additional sanction 
imposed purely for reasons of general deterrence would be disproportionate. It might be 
thought that mixed consequentialist-retributive theories could have the best of all worlds 
(although mixed theories face challenges of their own). Similarly, a non-retributive theory of 
justice might attempt to deal with the problem of deterrence, by allowing consequentialist 
considerations to play a role. 
To conclude this section: There are grounds for opposing grossly disproportionate 
punishments, which do not depend on retributive moral responsibility. This non-retributive 
conception of proportionality will not satisfy the retributive conception of justice, but may 
appeal to the intuitions of those who are not already committed to retributivism. A potential 
problem with this non-retributive approach is that the sanctions recommended might not be 
severe enough to promote general deterrence and this might threaten social stability. This is an 
empirical claim, which has been challenged by non-retributivists (e.g. Caruso 2018). However, 
it might be argued that non-retributive proportionality principles, could justifiably be 
19 
 
overridden by consequentialist considerations, in cases where social stability seemed to be 
seriously threatened. 
 
Due Process 
Daniel Dennett (2011, 2018), though far from being a traditional retributivist, has recently 
argued that there will be ‘totalitarianism’, unless we have a system of punishment based on 
desert. However, this ignores the fact that important individual rights and rules of due process 
apply in contexts where desert is not an issue e.g. when the state wishes to restrict the liberty 
of non-responsible, mentally ill offenders. Such individuals cannot be detained at the mere 
whim of a totalitarian dictator.  
For instance, article 5 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that 
such detention must be ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. Non-responsible 
individuals are also entitled to challenge the grounds for their detention. Article 5 (4) of the 
ECHR provides that ‘everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.’ This provision applies to sane 
people and to people of ‘unsound mind’. 
Domestic legislation also implements various safeguards which protect the rights of mentally 
ill persons against infringements by the authorities. The Mental Health (Care and 
Treatment)(Scotland) Act 2003 provides that a mentally ill person who may be subject to 
compulsory treatment or hospitalisation is entitled to have her interests defended by a ‘named 
person’.  Decisions about compulsory treatment/hospitalisation are made by a Mental Health 
Tribunal which is independent of the executive and which must consult with and provide 
information to the mentally ill person and her named person. The burden of proof is on the 
experts to demonstrate that the mentally ill person poses a ‘significant risk’ to the safety of 
herself or others and that compulsory treatment/hospitalisation is necessary. The Mental 
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Welfare Commission is a separate, independent body whose role is to protect the welfare of 
individuals who are vulnerable through mental disorder. The mentally ill person or her named 
person is also entitled to appeal against decisions to impose/continue compulsory treatment or 
hospitalisation. 
Thus it can be seen that several important principles of due process do not depend on basic 
desert moral responsibility and are applicable to sane and mentally ill individuals. To 
summarise, these principles include the following: interventions are prescribed by law; the 
burden of proof is on those who wish to intervene; decisions are made by courts or tribunals 
that are independent of the executive; the person who may be subject to the intervention is 
entitled to participate in the process and to be fully informed and adequately represented; 
persons subject to interventions are entitled to initiate a review of the legitimacy of the 
interventions. Any non-retributive response to law-breaking should uphold these principles. 
However, there are further principles of due process that should apply specifically to sane 
offenders. These will be discussed in the final section. 
 
Differences between Sane Law-Breakers and those with 
Mentally Disorders  
So far, this article has focussed on similarities between the norms governing our response to 
sane offenders and people who are dangerous due to mental disorder. However, there are also 
important differences between these groups that cannot be ignored. 
Different Methods of interacting with Sane Offenders and People with Mental 
Disorders 
Different methods are appropriate for dealing with the behaviour of mentally disordered as 
opposed to sane law-breakers. Psychiatric counselling or treatment is typically the best 
approach for mentally disordered law-breakers. Sometimes it is justifiable to make such 
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counselling or treatment compulsory, if the ability of the individual to make decisions about 
her own treatment is compromised by mental illness.  
However, the behaviour of sane offenders may change for the better if they come to see the 
force of the moral reasons against wrongdoing. It is widely accepted that rationality is 
compatible with determinism, even if retributive desert is not. Presenting offenders with moral 
reasons for reforming themselves shows respect for the offender’s ability to grasp such reasons. 
As we saw  in the example involving Timothy at the beginning of this article, it is important 
for the state to acknowledge and not deny positive qualities that citizens may have, even if the 
citizen is not retributively responsible for having those qualities. Rationality is a quality that 
sane offenders possess and which the state must recognise. Sane offenders might also benefit 
from certain limited kinds of psychological treatment or enhancement. However, such 
interventions should only be given to the offender if the offender consents (see e.g. Focquaert 
2014, Shaw 2014).   
The Trial Process 
Restrictions may sometimes be placed on the liberty of mentally disordered people, without 
ever putting those people through a criminal trial before a jury. This is often the most humane 
and sensible approach, since the issue of what treatment or supervision such mentally 
disordered people require is best determined by medical experts.  
However, as noted above, moral reasoning, rather than medical help is typically the appropriate 
means of enabling sane offenders to reform themselves. The trial process can serve as a vivid 
form of moral communication, which can help the offender to appreciate more fully the impact 
of her conduct on others and to resolve to change her behaviour (Duff 2001). It also shows 
respect for the offender’s rationality and membership of the moral community to allow her to 
give an account of her conduct in court, before other members of the community (Duff 2001).  
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Actual Conduct and Standards of Proof  
Before a sentence can be imposed on a sane offender, it must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that the person committed a crime. This principle can be justified on a non-retributive 
basis. It upholds the value of liberty by protecting the individual against the power of the state.  
The state also shows respect for citizens by having a very strong presumption that those citizens 
are non-dangerous. Past behaviour is one of the best guides to future behaviour.12 It is therefore 
appropriate that proof that the individual has actually engaged in dangerous conduct should be 
a necessary condition of interfering with the freedom of sane individuals. The state also shows 
respect for citizens by having a very strong presumption that their conduct is guided by the 
fundamental moral values embodied in the criminal law. 
 However, proof beyond reasonable doubt of actual law-breaking is not a necessary condition 
for the detention of mentally disordered people who are judged to be dangerous. Can this 
distinction between sane offenders and the mentally disordered be justified? Well, there are 
actually some genuine worries about forcing a mentally ill person to undergo treatment and/or 
confinement, without strong evidence that the individual has actually engaged in dangerous 
conduct. Reconsider the case of Timothy. Now imagine he is given a routine brain scan and 
the doctors conclude that he has certain structures in his brain that are strongly correlated with 
extreme violence. Recall that Timothy has always been gentle and friendly, enjoys wandering 
round the town and wants to be liked by people. On the basis of the brain scan evidence, 
Timothy is confined in a secure mental hospital. This seems rather disturbing. Some people 
may feel that the risk to others outweighs Timothy’s right to liberty. However, they may also 
feel that way about a sane person who was discovered to have the ‘extreme violence’ brain 
structure (particularly if that person was their neighbour, or their child’s teacher or babysitter). 
Conclusion 
This article contested the claim that social-protection approaches to criminal justice that do not 
rely on the retributive conception of moral responsibility, remove offenders from the “sphere 
                                                 
12 See J Callender, Free Will and Responsibility: A Guide for Practitioners (OUP, Oxford 2010), chapter 8. 
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of justice” and “rights” altogether. It argued that offenders would still be protected by non-
retributive considerations of justice, in virtue of the fact that they are persons. It focused on an 
analogy with those who are non-responsible due to mental illness, as this example has been 
invoked by critics of moral responsibility scepticism, but, in fact, supports the claim that moral 
and legal rights should (and to some extent already are) accorded to non-responsible 
individuals, based on their personhood. Traditionally, punishment theorists have often wanted 
to draw a very sharp distinction between sane and insane law-breakers. This may have been 
motivated by the poor treatment that people with mental health problems have historically 
received. These theorists did not want sane offenders to be treated equally badly. However, the 
treatment of both types of offender would be improved if we focussed on the need to respect 
personhood and the principles of justice that apply to all law-breakers. 
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